Fractured Multilateralism and missed opportunities in COP29’s inadequate response to the climate crisis: Reflections from SSN on COP29

Authored by Shehnaaz Moosa, Charlotte Scott, Yared Tsegay and Samson Mbewe.

 

COP29 concluded in Baku in the early hours of Sunday, 24 November, following a fractious and painful round of negotiations. This included a dramatic temporary walkout by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and least developed countries (LDCs) during climate finance negotiations. India and other countries strongly rejected the final decision text adopted on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG). As SSN reflects on COP29, it is clear that the conference has once again been marked by intense divisions, underscored by the persistent and deep inequities within global finance architecture. These tensions reflect an entrenched power dynamic that perpetuates imbalances in climate finance responsibilities.

While the summit produced a new climate finance goal, it fell markedly short of addressing the urgency of the climate crisis. This is a deeply disappointing outcome. For the most vulnerable nations in the Global South—those least responsible for climate change yet disproportionately affected by its impacts—this outcome represents a profound betrayal. The agreement, culminating in the “Baku Climate Unity Pact,” exemplified anything but unity, offering symbolic outcomes while neglecting the substantive changes needed. Without adequate climate finance availability and accessibility, ambition on mitigation has been dampened at a time when we had hoped COP29 would send a signal for urgent and ambitious action.

The summit once again exposed the limitations of a multilateral system where short-term national interests outweigh the global responsibility to provide accessible, adequate, and predictable climate finance in line with climate justice imperatives. This imbalance, compounded by the geopolitical influence of powers like the United States and Europe, continues to erode trust among nations and undermines the legitimacy of the UNFCCC process.

 

The NCQG: a necessary but insufficient step

The NCQG was mandated to be the first climate finance goal based on the quantified needs of developing countries to implement their NDCs. UNFCCC 2021 analysis indicates that this figure is at least USD 1.3 trillion per year by 2030, acknowledging that this is likely a significant underestimate. And yet developed countries at COP29 agreed to “provide and mobilise” a meagre USD 300 billion by 2035. Not only is this figure dramatically lower than needed and delivered five years too late, but it includes no specific public “provided” or grant equivalent commitment, both private and public sources can be counted towards the goal, including bilateral, multilateral and alternative sources.

 

It provides no clear definition of what does and does not count as climate finance, allowing developed countries to continue counting export credits and private investment towards the goal. This repeats all the same shortcomings that have been well documented and criticised of the USD 100 billion goal.

Developed countries and global media have nonetheless lauded this as a successful outcome, framing it as tripling the original USD 100 billion goal. But that figure was never intended to be a reflection of the actual need, and treating it as a baseline for a needs-based goal is misplaced. Even so, the USD100 billion goal was to be met in 2020, and adjusting for only inflationary increases would make it roughly USD 200 billion in 2035 with no additional effort needed. The new goal will now also count climate finance provided by developing countries, further watering down the obligations of developed countries. Some reports indicate that countries such as China already provide more climate finance than the US, despite the US owing a significantly higher “fair share”. Developed countries could theoretically provide even less than the scant USD 25.6 billion in grants they currently provide (approximately 25% of the USD 100 billion) and still claim to have met the new goal. In reality, USD 300 billion represents little to no increase in ambition.

The goal further fails to include targets for adaptation finance, any concrete provision for loss and damage finance nor any minimum provisions for Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and LDCs. It provides no solution to the problem of double-counting, where developed countries report their existing official development assistance (ODA) commitments as climate finance without contributing any new and additional funds. And while it includes language on the importance of improving access to finance, it lacks any concrete steps that will be taken to ensure what little finance there is reaches those that need it most.

The launch of the “Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T” shifts onto next year the work of making an operational plan to get from the current $100 billion to $1.3 trillion. No doubt, this heralds further difficult discussions ahead. To date, the track record of leveraging public finance into private finance has been uninspiring at best. Its ability to turn USD300bn into USD1.3tn remains highly unlikely.

 

The risk of carbon markets in the absence of climate finance

The outcome of the NCQG seems bleak in and of itself, but it appears even more so in the context of other COP29 decisions on carbon markets and the disappointingly low levels of pledges made to the Paris Agreement’s key funds: the Green Climate Fund (GCF), Adaptation Fund (AF) and Forests and Land Use Fund (FRLD).

While it is significant that COP29 was able to deliver an agreement on Article 6 after many years of deadlock, they left much to be desired. Real-world cases of fraud, inflated estimates of emissions reductions, land grabbing, and the dispossession of local communities and Indigenous Peoples have already been documented in carbon market schemes. Concerns remain about whether this approach can reliably reduce emissions or transfer funds to local communities. Minimalist oversight of carbon markets fails to address the risks of greenwashing and exploitation, particularly in vulnerable regions.

The combination of ultra-low ambition for providing additional public finance, coupled with a carbon market with little to no checks and balances, will further expose vulnerable developing countries to an open market without the means to hold private actors accountable. Collectively these decisions make the outlook clear: developed countries will not be stepping up to do their fair share. And developing countries will increasingly be reliant on low-regulation markets with any leadership largely coming from south-south collaboration and cooperation.

 

Global climate governance requires broader reform

Global mechanisms to hold developed countries accountable for unmet finance commitments remain weak. Climate leaders and civil society continue to call for reforms of the broader climate governance regime of the UNFCCC, including how COPs are run, as a necessary step to retaining the legitimacy of what is intended to be a consensus-driven process. While the UNFCCC remains one of the few global platforms where SIDS and LDCs are ostensibly given an equal voice alongside wealthy nations, COP29 saw their demands still sidelined and developed countries’ views dominating.

Meanwhile the rise of protectionism and resource nationalism in developed countries casts a long shadow over global solidarity. The outcomes of COP29 reflect these broader geopolitical dynamics, which hinder progress on collective climate goals and have eroded trust in the process.

As the Global South faces the harsh realities of climate change with insufficient finance to respond, the question remains whether the current framework can effectively deliver equitable and just climate solutions at scale.

 

Looking forward: COP30 and beyond 

The next year will see more discussions as part of the Baku to Belem Roadmap, but few are holding out hope for this process to do what 3 years of NCQG negotiations could not. Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) reforms are on-going, including within the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and while these reforms are welcome and necessary – in the absence of a strong NCQG, they will need to come to quick and ambitious decisions on contentious issues such as meaningful debt relief, eliminating financing for fossil fuel projects and increased transparency and accountability. It’s not clear if these outcomes are within reach, but even ambitious outcomes cannot adequately address the historical debt owed by wealthier nations.

Outside of the UNFCCC, parties will look to other global platforms to step into the void- particularly the Group of Twenty (G20).

 

In December 2024, South Africa assumed the presidency of the G20 as the first African economy to do so, and priority areas include addressing climate change, energy and debt crises. Development financing gaps and reforming the global tax regime are likely to be on the agenda.

Promising developments outside the UNFCCC include an advisory opinion on climate change expected to be issued by the International Court of Justice, the first of its kind. Hearings are being held early in December, and deliberations will include the obligations of states to prevent climate change and provide reparations. While a strong advisory opinion will not be binding, it could signal fertile ground for greater legal action to drive climate action forward and secure compensation for the worst affected communities and states. Whatever the future holds post-COP29, ambitious global action and accountability remain imperative. While the task of leading this charge should not fall so unfairly on developing countries and local communities, south-south cooperation and southern leadership remain some of the few optimistic bright spots on an otherwise bleak landscape.